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Beyond the Williamson Act:
Alternatives for More Effective
Preservation of Agricultural Land in
California
Agriculture is the number one industry in California.' In 1982, state
agricultural endeavors produced an estimated $14.3 billion in sales.2
California produces twenty-five percent of the table foods grown in
the United States. 3 The state is the primary national source of a wide
variety of specialty crops.' More than $3.3 billion in foreign exports
were accounted for by California agriculture in 1982.1
The continued preeminence of agriculture in the state, however,
is not guaranteed. By various estimates, 55,0006 to 150,000 acres of
prime agricultural lands8 annually are being converted to urban and
other uses. The best farmland is flat and drains well.9 This farmland,
therefore, is easy and profitable to develop. As the prime acres disappear, they must be replaced by a dwindling reserve'0 of undeveloped,
potential farmland. Unfortunately, many of these acres are costly to
develop." In recent years, seventy-five percent 2 of the newly irrigated
1. See SECURITY PACIFIC BANK, ECoNOMICs DEPARTMENT, CALIFoRNiA's AGRiCULTURAL
TRENDs & IssuFs 1 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
2. Id.
3. See R. FmELLmm, PoLmrcs OF LAND, RALPH NADER'S STUDY GRouP REPORT ON LAND
UsE IN CALIFORNIA 26 (1973).
4. Id. Among the products for which California is the primary source nationally are
almonds, artichokes, broccoli, carrots, celery, garlic, grapes, lettuce, olives, onions, prunes,
safflower, tomatoes, and walnuts. Id.
5. See SECURITY PACIFIC BANK, supra note 1, at 35.
6. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, DRAF REPORT, CArFoRNIA Sol/s, AN
AssEssMENT IV-39 (1979) (hereinafter DRAFr SoiLs). The figure of 55,000 acres was derived
from a survey of Resource Conservation Districts, and represents a five-year average from 1974-79.
Id.
7. FELLMETH, supra note 3, at 27.
8. No single definition of prime agricultural lands is universally accepted. A workable
guideline is the U.S. Soil Conservation Service Classification system, which divides land into
eight classes of use capability on the basis of factors including slope, water-holding capacity,
soil depth and texture. Class I-IV lands are suitable for varying types of agricultural uses,
with Class I and II lands generally being considered "prime." Id. Statutory definitions of prime
agricultural land vary. See infra notes 54, 209 and accompanying text.
9. See FELLmETH, supra note 3, at 28.
10. Diij Sore, supra note 6, at IV-40. The reserve is estimated to be less than eight
million acres. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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lands in California were those with a medium or low potential 3 for
agricultural production. These lands require significantly greater expenditures for agricultural development than do the best prime lands, 4
and consume greater amounts of energy'" and water 16 to achieve an
adequate level of production. In addition, the availability of water

is a significant barrier to the development of arid lands 7 that are

otherwise suitable for varying degrees of agricultural use. Urban
dwellers and industries each year demand more state water resources,
indicating a likelihood that less, not more, water will be available
for future agriculture.'"
The shrinking reserve of prime agricultural lands and the economic
and environmental costs of converting idle land to economic use illustrate a need to conserve prime farmlands. 9 State government has
recognized this need. The official state policy favors the conservation
of prime farmland. 20 State agencies are in the process of mapping
prime farmland throughout the state and establishing a system for
monitoring the conversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses. 2' Some
local governments have made important efforts to conserve prime
agricultural lands wherever possible. 22 The conversion of prime
farmland, nevertheless, has continued.23
The primary, longstanding state effort to slow the conversion of
prime farmland has been through the use of the California Land Con13. Id. These are Class III-IV lands, according to the Soil Conservation Service Scale. Id.
14. See DRAr Sons, supra note 6, at IV-40. Expenses include tillage, residue management, drainage improvement, and irrigation systems. Id.
15. See Zinn, Exports and Energy: New Factors in U.S. AgriculturalLand Policy, in BEYoND
THE URBAN FRINGE, LAND USE IssuEs OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA 193 (1983). Zinn believes

energy costs show an important reason why the best farmlands, which use relatively less energy,
should be preserved. Id.
16. DRArT Sons, supra note 6, at IV-40.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Dresslar, Agricultural Land Preservation in California: Time for a New View,
8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 303-04 (1979); Dean, The California Land Conservation Act of 1965
and the Fight to Save California'sPrime Agricultural Lands, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1859, 1859-62
(1979). But see Baden, AgriculturalLand Preservation; Threshing the Wheat From the Chaff,

in 13 CENTER FOR PLANNING, ZoNING AND EMINENT DoMAIN 171, 171-77 (1983). See generally
W. FLETCHER AND C. LrrrLE, THE AMERIcAN CROPLAND CRISIS, (1983) (providing a broad and
easy to read overview of the national loss of farmlands and the various means employed to
combat this loss).
20.

CAL. AGRIC. CODE §821(a).

21. In 1982, the state legislature enacted a statute requiring the state Department of Conservation to establish a permanent mapping program to track how much agricultural land is
added to cultivated acres in the state and how much is lost. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §65570.
22.
23.

See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
Interview with Darwyn H. Briggs, assistant state conservationist, U.S. Soil Conserva-

tion Service, at Davis, California, Jan. 26, 1984. (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Interview].
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servation Act of 196524 (hereinafter the CLCA). The CLCA, also
known as the Williamson Act, 25 attempts to preserve farmland by
extracting a promise from landowners to forego development of their
land, in exchange for a lower property tax assessment. History has
proven, however, that the CLCA is ineffective in this respect.26
Although the CLCA probably has helped educate the public about
the loss of prime farmlands, the Act has failed to slow the rate of
farmland conversion."
This comment will outline the important provisions of the CLCA
and will explore the reasons why the Act fails as a measure to protect prime agricultural lands from urbanization. A discussion of three
alternatives for preserving farmland will follow. These alternatives are:
(1) statewide, centralized planning and control of land-use
decision-making,28 (2) purchase of prime lands or development rights
in prime land by public or private entities,29 and (3) transfer of development rights." Finally, this author will argue that, although the above
alternatives have potential for conserving farmland, California should
adopt a fourth alternative.31 This alternative combines tax incentives
with greater state-local cooperation in land use planning to establish
a consensus for effective preservation of prime agricultural lands.
THE CALnFORNIA LAND CONSERVATION ACT

To appreciate the need for reform of California farmland conservation efforts, the deficiencies of the CLCA must be explored. These

deficiencies are traceable to a limited view of farmland conversion
inherent in the Act. The loss of farmland is attributable to numerous
factors, including the profitability of farmland,32 rising property taxes
at the urban fringe,33 government regulations,34 personal career
decisions,3" urban growth pressures,3 6 the value of land, 37 and specula24.
25.

CAL. Gov'T CODE §§51200-51295.
The Act is named for former state Assemblyman John Williamson of Bakersfield.

See id. at §51200.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra notes 50-120 and accompanying text.
See Interview, supra note 23.
See infra notes 121-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 186-207 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 208-31 and accompanying text.
NATIONAL AGRICuLTuRAL LANDS STUDY, THE PROTECTION OF FARMuAND: A REFERENCE
GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 16 (1981) [hereinafter NALS REPORT].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

1153

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15

tion in farmland with the expectation of future development. 8 The
CLCA directly addresses only one of these factors, rising property
taxes at the urban fringe.
When urban sprawl became a dominant land-use growth pattern
following World War II," concern grew as farmer after farmer sold
his land to developers. Many perceived that the decision to sell was
motivated in large part by rising property taxes.4 The traditional
method of property taxation in California and other states is based
on assessments related directly to the market value of the land. Lands
are taxed at a percentage of their fair market value.," As urban areas
grow outward into farming areas, the market value of the farmlands
close to developed lands increases because the land becomes attractive for development. With the increasing urbanization of American
farmlands following World War II, market values and property taxes
rose accordingly.
In some instances in California, property taxes rose by 1600 percent in one year. 2 Many believed that these rising property taxes were
forcing farmers to sell because the taxes cut into revenues and farmers
could no longer make a profit from agriculture. 3 The CLCA was
created to counter rising property taxes as a factor contributing to
urban sprawl.
The proposed solution to the tax plight of American farmers was
to assess farmland at a percentage of the income the land produces,
so that a farmer's property taxes would vary only according to the
value of the agricultural goods produced, rather than according to
the proximity of the farmland to development." The concept is known
generally as differential or "use-value" assessment."' Forty-six states,
including California, employ use-value assessment in one form or
another to reduce the tax burdens of farmers and to slow the rate
of urbanization by reducing the number of sales motivated or forced
by high taxes. 6
Use-value assessment alone, however, cannot ensure the preserva-

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
See FELAumH, supra note 3, at 27-32.
Id. at 31.
CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §401.

42. See FEaLL=,

supra note 3, at 32.

43. Id.
44. See D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPirNT 1272 (1979).
45. Id.
46. NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 56. Two other states provide farmers credits or rebates
on their income taxes. Id.

1154

1984 / PreservingAgriculturalLands

tion of farmland. While lower taxes may encourage some farmers
to keep farming, others will sell their land because high market values

may make selling the land more profitable than farming it.4" Critics
charged that many early use-value assessment statutes actually en-

couraged the urbanization of farmland because speculators could buy
land and keep it idle until the land was ripe for development." Lower

use-value assessments merely reduced the expense of holding the land
until the maximum profit could be made.4 9

In 1965, California enacted the CLCA, a pioneering use-value assessment statute that attempted to address the concerns of the critics about
use-value assessment." The CLCA required those who received the
benefits of use-value assessment to give something in return, an agreement to maintain their lands in agricultural use for at least ten years. 5'
The ten year "restrictive use agreement," proponents hoped, would
discourage speculation and allow local governments time during which

they could make reasoned and unhurried planning decisions regarding the eventual use of encumbered lands. 2 Weaknesses in the provisions of the CLCA, however, have prevented these hopes from being

fully realized. These provisions and weaknesses now will be examined.
A.

Provisions of the CLCA

The CLCA53 is an enabling act that gives cities and counties the
authority to offer use-value assessment to owners of prime agricultural"4
and other open-space lands in exchange for a restrictive use agree47.

48.
49.
50.

See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
See MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 44, at 1271-72.

Id.
See Barlowe & Alter, Use-Value Assessment of Farm and Open Space Lands, in

MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM,

supra note 44, at 1273-76.

51. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
52. See Barlowe, supra note 50, at 1273-76.
53. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§51230-51295.
54. "Prime agricultural land" means any of the following:
(1) All land which qualifies for rating as class I or class II in the Soil Conservation
Service land use capability classifications.
(2) Land which qualifies for rating 80 through 100 in the Storie Index Rating.
(3) Land which supports livestock used for the production of food and fiber and
which has an annual carrying capacity equivalent to at least one animal unit per
acre as defined by the United States Department of Agriculture.
(4) Land planted with fruit- or nut-bearing trees, vines, bushes or crops which have
a nonbearing period of less than five years and which will normally return during
the commercial bearing period on an annual basis from the production of unprocessed agricultural plant production not less than two hundred dollars ($200) per acre.
(5) Land which has returned from the production of unprocessed agricultural plant
products an annual gross value of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) per acre
for three of the previous five years.
Id. at §51201(c).
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ment. Participation in the CLCA is voluntary for both local governments and landowners. To compensate for lost property tax revenues
resulting from lower tax assessments, local governments may be partially subsidized with "subvention" payments from the state." For
lands to be eligible for enrollment in the CLCA, local governments
must establish areas within which use-value assessment can be offered.' 6
Owners of lands within these designated areas then must sign contracts with the appropriate local government." These contracts set
forth the agreement between the landowners and the governments by
which use-value assessment is exchanged for restrictive use agreements.
1.

Agricultural Preserves

The initial step in the process of enrolling lands in the CLCA is
the establishment of an "agricultural preserve" 58 by a city or county.
An agricultural preserve is simply a designated area of land within
which local governments may offer CLCA contracts. Preserves are
usually established at the request of a landowner or group of
landowners. 9 Preserves may or may not correspond with those areas
designated by the local general plan for agricultural use, or with those
areas that are best suited for preservation.60 A public hearing is required before a preserve may be approved by local government. 6' A
preserve must consist of at least 100 acres62 unless smaller parcels
are appropriate for established local agricultural uses. 63 Preserves of
less than 100 acres, unlike larger parcels, also must be consistent with
the local general plan by which most land-use decisions are made."
The failure of the CLCA to tie agricultural preserves to local general
plans is a significant weakness of the Act. This weakness is compounded by the failure of the CLCA to mandate that preserves be

55. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.

56. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§51230-51239.
59. CALiFoRNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION RESOURCE PROTECTION UNIT, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: A REPORT ON THE WvLLIAMsoN ACT AND THE OPEN SPACE SUBVENTION PROGRAM
5 (October 1978) [hereinafter ExEctrw SUmmARY]. The Executive Summary contains the result
of a survey of local officials in the counties and cities that have implemented the CLCA (Williamson Act). Id. at 1. Questionnaires were sent to elected officials, planning directors, administrative
staff, tax assessors, and agricultural commissioners. About 80 percent of the questionnaires
were completed and returned. Id.
60. Id. at 5.
61. CAL. GOV'T CODE §51230.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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established only after a study of the appropriateness of preserving
the lands within proposed preserves. Ideally, requirements of coincidence with local general plans and studies of preservation appropriateness would increase the likelihood that the conservation of
farmland would be considered in the overall context of planned growth.
Some prime lands necessarily must be developed as a city or county
grows, but effective planning could keep the loss of prime farmland
to a minimum. Since most local governments establish agricultural
preserves at the request of landowners, the landowners, in effect, are
making land use decisions that affect the locality, but may not always
be in the best planning interests of the locality. The decisions are
made on a piecemeal basis and do not enhance the effectiveness of
comprehensive planning efforts. 5
2.

CLCA Contracts

Once an agricultural preserve has been established, all prime
agricultural lands within the preserve are eligible for enrollment in
CLCA contracts." The contracts bind the local government to a promise of utilizing use-value assessment and bind the landowner to a
promise of restricting land owned to agricultural use. Contracts must
contain similar terms for all parcels of land within a given agricultural
preserve. 7 Benefits and burdens of the contracts run with the land
for the duration of the contract, regardless of changes in ownership,
or subdivision of the land." Contracts must run for an initial term
of no less than ten years. 9 In the absence of action by the landowner
or local government, an additional year is added automatically to the
term of the contract upon the anniversary date of the contract or
another date specified by the contract."0 The automatic renewal provision has the effect of giving the contract a perpetual duration, unless
some action is taken to terminate the arrangement.
Contracts may be terminated in two ways, by notice of nonrenewal'
or by cancellation." Nonrenewal may be exercised by the landowner
or the local government. If a notice of nonrenewal is served by the
landowner or local government before the automatic renewal date,

65.

See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.

66. See

CAL. GOV'T CODE

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

id.§51241.
§51243.
§51244.

72.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

§§51240-51255.

§51245.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§51280-51286.
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the contract will remain in force for nine years following notice,"
assuming an initial term of ten years. For example, if a landowner
exercises the option of nonrenewal five years after entering into a
ten year CLCA contract, the restriction on the use of the land will
not expire until nine years following notice of nonrenewal, or fourteen years after the contract was signed.
The CLCA attempts to discourage landowners from exercising the
option of nonrenewal by providing for an immediate increase in property tax assessment. 7" The assessments will reach the equivalent of
fair market value assessment by the seventh year following notice of
nonrenewal."1 Local government revenues also may suffer initially from
nonrenewal because the participating local government no longer will
be compensated with state subvention payments."6 Nonrenewal is the
only way to terminate a CLCA contract when cancellation is
unavailable.
Cancellation is available only to the landowner and will result in
the immediate termination of tax benefits and restricted use if the
cancellation application is approved by the local government.7"
Cancellation, like nonrenewal, results in a penalty to the landowner.
Upon cancellation, the landowner must pay to the state a fee equal
to 12.5 percent of the fair market value of the land as of the date
of cancellation. 8 This fee may be waived by the local government,
however, if waiver would be in the public interest." 9 Waiver must be
approved by the State Secretary of Resources. 8" In addition to the
cancellation fee, if any, the landowner must pay back to local government any tax savings gained while the enrolled land was burdened
by the contract.8 '
Nonrenewal and cancellation point to another weakness of the
CLCA. The Act fails to provide for long-term preservation of prime
farmlands. Even though a particular parcel may be appropriate for
preservation and is enrolled in the CLCA, a landowner may remove
any protection the act may give simply by cancelling the contract or

73. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, LAND RESOURCES PROTECTION UNIT, SPECIAL
SERVICES FOR RESOURCE PROTECTION, WILLIAMSON ACT BRIEFING SUMMARY 5 (May, 1981)
[hereinafter BRIaMio SuMMARY].

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77, CAL. GOV'T CODE §51281; see also BRIEFING SUMMARY, supra note 73, at 6.
78. Id. §51283.
79. Id. §51283(c).

80.

Id. §51283(c)(3).

81.

Id. §51283.1
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serving notice of nonrenewal. The landowner's decision also is more
likely to be motivated by the chances for individual profits rather
than by the public need for the conservation of farmland. A further
weakness of the CLCA is evidenced by the patterns of enrollment
in the Act. While large numbers of landowners have entered into
CLCA contracts, few of the lands enrolled are located in areas subject to development pressure of urban sprawl.
3.

Participation

As of May 1981, forty-eight of fifty-eight California counties offered
CLCA contracts to eligible landowners.8" About 16,000,000 acres, constituting thirty percent of the privately owned land in the state, were
enrolled in the program. 3 Unfortunately, only about 580,000 of these
acres were "urban prime" lands," those most subject to development
pressures. Another 4,500,000 acres were nonurban prime lands.15 The
remaining were nonagricultural open space lands." Although much
of the land in the nonurban and open space categories certainly is
worth preserving, most of these lands are subject to little or no development pressure. Whether these lands need the protection of use-value
assessment is questionable.
Land enrolled in the CLCA is subject to generally lower property
taxes than non-enrolled land. Consequently, the CLCA represents not
only a tax break to landowners but also a tax loss to local governments. This tax loss is partially compensated by the state through
subvention payments.
4.

Subvention

To minimize complaints of lost revenue from use-value assessment,
and possibly to encourage local government participation in the CLCA,
the state enacted the Open Space Subvention Act8 7 in 1971. By this
statute, the state partially compensates local governments for tax
revenue lost because of the CLCA. Compensation is paid according
to the relative agricultural value of enrolled lands, and the proximity
of enrolled lands to urban areas. Subvention payments are disbursed
annually at a rate of $8 per acre for urban prime lands located within
three miles of an incorporated city with a population of 25,000 or
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

BRmwr, SuhmARY, supra note 73, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§16140-16153.
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more, $5 per acre for prime lands adjacent to smaller incorporated
cities, and $1 per acre for nonurban prime lands. 8 For the 1982-83
fiscal year, more than $13.4 million was paid to local governments
in subvention payments.8 9
The availability of subvention payments apparently has not
encouraged local governments to extend the use of the CLCA. A 1978
state survey of local governmental officials indicated the subvention
program had little effect on local government use of the CLCA. 9°
Some officials expressed the view that the entitlements were inadequate to compensate for tax revenues lost because of CLCA contracts
and therefore, subvention payments should be increased. 9' Officials,
however, did indicate that subvention payments increased political support for the CLCA by minimizing local criticism of tax shifts to CLCA
enrollment. 92
B.

The CLCA is Ineffective

Although political support for the CLCA has increased, the effectiveness of the program as a tool for preserving prime land has not.
The CLCA has been criticized as a disguised tax dodge for large corporations that own huge tracts of enrolled lands in areas not subject
to development pressure93 and as a measure that has little, if any
effect on the rate of urbanization of prime farmlands. 94 The most
significant problems with the CLCA are threefold: (1) a lack of enrollment of prime agricultural land near urban areas, 95 (2) the temporary
nature of protection provided by CLCA contracts,96 and (3) the failure

of the CLCA to provide for comprehensive and long-term planning
for the preservation of prime farmlands. 97
A major purpose claimed for the CLCA is the prevention of

88. BRIEF Na Su-mARY, supra note 73, at 2-3. Subventions are paid for "open-space"
lands at the rate of 40 cents per acre. Id.
89.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, OPEN SPACE SUBVENTON ENTITLEMENTS,

1982-83 FIscAL YEAR. This one-page, annual release lists the amounts received pursuant to the
subvention program by all cities and counties that participate in the CLCA. See id.
90. EXEcuTV E SumAY, supra note 59, at 2.
91. Id.at 3.
92. Id. at 2. When the CLCA was first being used by local governments, tax revenues
lost be enrollment in CLCA contracts were often recouped by increasing the burdens of nonenrolled landowners. See Walters, Punching Holes in the Williamson Act, 14 CAL. J. 459, 459-61
(December, 1983).
93. FELLMETH, supra note 3, at 41-42.
94. ExacuTivE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at 2. See also FELUAETH, supra note 3, at 41-42.
95. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 110-I1 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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premature and unnecessary urbanization of agricultural lands.98

Experience has shown, however, that the owners of lands most subject to development pressures, prime lands on the urban fringes, are

the least likely landowners to enter into CLCA contracts. The probable reason for this reluctance is that the CLCA provides landowners
with an inadequate incentive to forego development or sale of their

farmlands. Fewer than one million of the sixteen million acres enrolled in the CLCA statewide are within three miles of an urban area.9 9

Many of the acres enrolled within these three mile circles are located
in areas where the existence of development pressures is debatable.

Local planning directors have indicated that few CLCA contracts have
been signed in areas where the probability of development exists' 0
and that less than fifteen percent of the enrolled acreage will face
development within twenty years,"0 ' notwithstanding contractual restrictions. These same officials have indicated the CLCA has had little

effect on the rate of conversion of prime lands.' 2
Numerous researchers have concluded the minimal enrollment of
lands subject to development pressure is due to the insufficiency of
CLCA incentives.' 03 Urban-fringe landowners will not forego the prospects of selling their lands to developers for a substantial profit. Prior
to the passage of Proposition 13,' °4 a 1978 voter initiative which re-

duced property taxes statewide, the average property tax reduction
for enrolled urban prime lands was about eighty percent.' 0 ' After the
passage of Proposition 13, tax savings have been reduced to about

sixty percent.' 6 For most owners of prime urbanlands, the tax advantages of CLCA enrollment should be attractive, notwithstanding

the Proposition 13 effects. The profits to be made by selling to
98. CAL. Gov'T CODE §51220. Section 51220 sets out the legislative findings underlying
the CLCA. Id. §51220(a)-(e).
99. See BRImFIN SUrMtARy, supra note 73, at 3.
100. ExEcuTiVE SummARY, supra note 59, at 4.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Carmen, California Landowners' Adoption of a Use-Value Assessment Program,
53 LAND EcONNozcs 275, 285-86 (1977); Hansen & Schwartz, Prime Land Preservation: The
CaliforniaLand Conservation Act, 31 JOURNAL OF SoIL AND WATER CONSERVATION 198, 202
(1976). "Since the CLCA uses tax inducements, the economic incentives provided under the
act are fundamental to any evaluation of the program's effectiveness." Id. See also FELLMETH,
supra note 3, at 41.
104. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §7. Proposition 13, a voter's initiative, reduced property taxes
for all real property owners statewide by rolling back assessments to the 1975 level. See California
Department of Conservation, Division of Land Resources Protection, THE WILLIAMSON ACT
AFTER PROPOSmON 13: STIL A BARGAIN iii (1983) (hereinafter STILL A BARGAIN). This report
is the result of a survey of CLCA tax advantages in 19 counties. Id. at 1.
105. See STILL A BAGAIN, supra note 104, at iii.
106. Id.
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developers, however, are even more attractive. For example, an acre
of prime land may sell for $4,000 as farmland, but could bring $40,000
or more if sold for development."0 7
At least one study indicates that most urban prime landowners who
decide against enrolling in the CLCA in order to have the option
of selling to developers are being unrealistic.' °8 Their lands will not
be attractive to developers until years later when development has
grown closer. Nevertheless, given the choice between tax advantages
and speculation, the chance of a large profit appears to be the overriding consideration' 9 for a landowner making a decision regarding
enrollment in the CLCA. Even if the landowner does decide to enroll,
the CLCA will not guarantee that participation will endure because
CLCA contracts provide only short-term protection for prime
farmlands.
The CLCA also is criticized because the Act fails to provide longterm preservation of agricultural lands." ' At present, any enrolled
land will remain under contract only so long as the contract is advantageous economically to the landowner. When tax savings are
outweighed by the profits to be made by selling the land, farmers
can opt for nonrenewal or cancellation. The penalties incurred by
exercising these options will reduce only partially the profits landowners
can make if they sell their lands for development."' While the CLCA
may provide a needed tax break to farmers, the restrictive use
agreements required by the Act provide only a feeble and temporary
barrier to development.
The lack of urban fringe enrollment and the temporary nature of
CLCA contracts might be less important if the CLCA provided for
more coordinated and thoughtful planning for the conservation of
agricultural lands. Although the CLCA mandates agricultural preserves,
the Act fails to require that preserves be formed only after a study
has been conducted to determine whether the land within a proposed
preserve area should be protected. The CLCA also fails to tie in with
the local general plan to ensure that agricultural preserves are
established in a manner consistent with local planning priorities. Thus,
the Act does nothing to discourage piecemeal land use decision-making,
which is one of the roots of the urban sprawl problem.
Part of the problem may be that the CLCA operates within the
107.

See Interview, supra note 23.

108.

See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 103, at 202.

109.
110.

Carmen, supra note 103, at 286.
See FaajimaTH, supra note 3, at 41-2.
See NAls REPORT, supra note 32, at 208.

111.
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context of land use decision-making as it exists in California and much
of the United States. Land use decisions in California are primarily
the responsibility of local government."1 2 The state has mandated that
land use decisions be made pursuant to a general plan ' 3 and that
the environmental impacts of land use decisions be considered." 4 These
mandates, however, do not require that local decisions reflect regional
and state interests. Most often, decisions reflect local interests alone."'
Local officials are representative of their communities. They make
decisions that afe advantageous to the community, ' 6 either by increasing the local tax base through development that brings in high
taxes but requires little in the way of services, or by pleasing the
developers and others" 7 in the development process who are among
the local officials' strongest constituents.
This local focus can prove detrimental to the interests of neighboring communities, the state and the nation."' In the case of agricultural
land preservation, a local focus may result in the weighing of the
local benefits of agricultural lands against the benefits of development. While farmlands require little in the way of local services,
farmland does not provide new tax revenues or jobs for the construction industry. Depending on community priorities, the importance of
prime agricultural lands as a state and national resource may be
ignored. An additional problem is that local governments often may
lack the expertise'' and funding necessary to study the local lands
and formulate plans to direct development to the most appropriate
areas, while retaining prime farmland in an undeveloped state. The
lack of funding and expertise, along with the local focus of land use
decision-making, may contribute to what has been criticized as inconsistent and varying administration of the CLCA.' 2 °

112. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, §7 (setting forth a general grant of police power to counties
and cities).
113. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§65300, 65700. The general plan must contain an "open space"
element, of which agricultural use is a subelement. Id. §65300.
114. Id. §§21000-21165. These code sections set forth the California Environmental Quality
Act. The Act requires that adverse environmental impacts be identified and eliminated or
mitigated, if possible. The impossibility of eliminating or mitigating impacts, however, will
not necessarily result in the cancellation of any projects.
115. See FEL.METH, supra note 3, at 389.
116. See F. BossEaLMA & D. CALLIEs, THE QUIET REvoLrION INLAND USE CoNTROL 1 (1972).
117. See M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EcONOIC
AND GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 102-04 (1971). Important actors in the decision-making process
include homebuyers, the homebuilding industry, and lenders. Id.
118. See Dresslar, supra note 19, at 307; FEI.mET, supra note 3, at 389-90; BossELMAN
& CALLYEs, supra note 116, at 3.
119. See Dresslar, supra note 19, at 307.
120. See ExEcuTrvE SUmMARY, supra note 59, at 1.
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The foregoing analysis has shown the reasons that the CLCA is
not an effective means of preserving prime farmlands in California.
The lands most in need of protection are not enrolled in CLCA contracts. Even if these lands were enrolled, the restrictive use agreements
embodied in CLCA contracts provide little in the way of long-term
protection from urbanization. The most significant weakness of the
CLCA is the failure to encourage more effective planning for farmland
retention. This comment now will examine alternative methods of
preserving farmlands in California. Available alternatives include the
following: (1) statewide, centralized planning, (2) land trust or conservancy options, and (3) transfer of development rights.
ALTERNATIVES

TO THE

CLCA

Some critics of the CLCA have suggested that California agricultural
land could be protected from urbanization if the state would establish
a centralized planning structure in which the state is more directly
involved.' Hawaii and Oregon provide examples of these plans. In
California, certain regional areas have centralized planning bodies.
A substantial controversy exists, however, whether more extensive centralized planning structures would be politically acceptable in California. Hawaii and Oregon have successfully implemented statewide
planning programs that preserve prime farmland. Political considerations, however, make the implementation of statewide programs in
California doubtful. Consequently, centralized planning in California
may be limited to a few regional efforts.
A.

The Hawaiian Experience

In Hawaii, passage of the Land Use Law' 22 in 1961 gave state agencies greater control of land use planning and decision-making than
in any other state.' 23 The law resulted from concerns about rapid
growth due to an economic upsurge that followed statehood.'24 The
legislation was supported by the owners of prime agricultural land
who grew lucrative specialty crops.' 25 The law was aimed, in large
26
part, at protecting prime farmlands from the expansion of Honolulu.
At the time of passage, Hawaii, unlike mainland states, had no strong
121.
122.
123.

See Dresslar, supra note 19, at 303-04; FEImEaH, supra note 3, at 42-43.

125.
126.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 6.

See HAW. REv. STAT. §§205-1-205-37.
See BOSSELMAN & CALuEs, supra note 116, at 5.
124. Id. at 6.
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history of local land use control. 2 7 Hawaii had become a state only
2
recently and was accustomed to a centralized, territorial government.1 1
Under Hawaiian law, land use authority is shared by four state
governmental bodies'2 9 that oversee planning and development decision30
making for all island lands, which are divided into four districts:
urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation. While these governmental bodies, of course, are subject to lobbying from special interest
groups, decisions over the years have displayed a substantial consensus for the policy of preserving prime agricultural lands that support
the state pineapple and sugar industries.' 3 ' Hawaii is unique in being
the only state to establish land use zoning at the state level. A consensus for the preservation of prime farmlands, however, apparently
also has been reached in Oregon.
B.

Oregonian Planning

Oregon, in contrast with Hawaii, attempts to preserve prime
farmland and control growth in general by providing stronger mandates to local decision-makers. In 1973, following a recent upsurge
in growth throughout the state, the state enacted the Oregon Land
Use Act (hereinafter the OLUA).3 2 According to one federal study,
the OLUA established the most comprehensive land use planning and
regulation system in the United States.' The Act specifically protects twelve types of environmentally sensitive lands. The necessity
of protecting prime farmlands, however, was the foremost concern
34
leading to the adoption of the program.
The OLUA created a state agency, the Land Conservation and
Development Commission (hereinafter the LCDC) to head the planning structure. 3 5 The primary duty of the LCDC is to develop statewide
planning goals and regulations. 3 6 These regulations are to be used
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The boards are: the Hawaiian Land Use Commission, the Department of Planning
and Economic Development, the Department of Land and Natural Resources, and the Board
of Land and Natural Resources. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 13. Bosselman and Callies list two other policies that have guided Hawaiian
land use decision-making: (1) Tourist-attracting development should be encouraged without dis-

turbing the attractions of the natural landscape, and (2) "compact and efficient urban areas
should
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

be preserved where people can live at reasonable cost." Id.
OE. REv. STAT. §§197.000-197.650.
NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by state agencies and local governmental entities in preparing and administering comprehensive land use plans.' Plans must conform with
the goals and regulations. 38 The LCDC has the authority to review
all plans for compliance and to issue enforcement orders if the
guidelines are not followed. 3 9
As of 1981, the LCDC had adopted nineteen mandatory goals and
accompanying guidelines for use in the adoption of land use plans. 40
Some of these goals deal specifically with the preservation of
agricultural land. One important mandate is that all towns and cities
with a population of 2500 or more must establish urban growth
boundaries. "' These boundaries, which allow for some future growth,
mark the effective limits of urban expansion.' 42 Another mandate is
the creation of exclusive farm use zones,' "3 which are comprised of
lands that are declared off limits to most development. The zones
are created and administered by local governments according to state
guidelines. Farmers in these zones receive the benefits of lower property taxes and protection from local ordinances that might interfere
with farming activities. ""
Apparently, the OLUA enjoys widespread public support. The program twice has won more than sixty percent of the votes cast when
the OLUA was challenged in statewide referenda in 1976 and 1978.'"1
Support also has grown among local governments.'" In addition, a
strong public interest organization has proved to be successful in enforcing OLUA mandates in the state courts.' 7 The efforts of this
organization apparently have helped ensure local governmental
adherence to the intent of the program.' 8 The programs of Oregon
and Hawaii have proved successful because those states have reached
a working consensus for centralized control of land-use planning and
for the preservation of prime farmlands. California has been able to
reach a similar consensus only regarding a few specific resource areas.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

141.
142.

See FLETCHER & LirTE, supra note 19, at 35.
See id.

143.

See id.

144.

See id.

145.
146.
147.
148.

NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 243.
Id.
Id. at 239. The public interest group calls itself 1000 Friends of Oregon. Id.
Id.
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C. California Regional Planning

Of three major regional planning efforts by California, two have
nothing to do with the preservation of farmland. One is aimed at
the conservation of the San Francisco Bay. In 1965, the California
Legislature created the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission." 9 This agency attempts to ensure that filling and
development of San Francisco Bay does not destroy the value of the
bay for water-oriented uses,' 50 for recreation,' as a breeding ground
for fish and wildlife, 5 2 and for aesthetic benefits.' 53 The other regional
planning effort in California is aimed at the preservation of Lake
Tahoe. In 1970, an interstate compact between California and Nevada
created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency to regulate development
in the Lake Tahoe basin.' 54 The goal of the agency is to ensure that
the clarity of the lake waters and the quality of the surrounding environment will not be unavoidably diminished.'
The most extensive centralized planning program in the state, the
California Coastal Act of 1972,156 was mandated by a voter initiative.
A new state agency, the California Coastal Commission, was created
pursuant to the voter mandate.' 7 The Commission is charged with
regulating planning and development along the California coast. The
agency has responsibilities analogous to the LCDC in Oregon"' and
has shown concern for the preservation of important coastal
agricultural lands 59 by denying permits for numerous proposed
developments that would have encroached on prime coastal farmland.'60
While centralized planning has been accepted for specific areas of
California, achieving a greater degree of state control over the fate
of agricultural lands throughout California could be much more difficult. One state study indicates that eighty percent 6 ' of the California public favors more effective preservation of farmland, but this
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§66600-66650.
Bosss.mAN & CALSms, supra note 116, at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§67040-67073.
BOSSELMAN & CALLmS, supra note 116, at 109.
See CAL. POB. REs. CODE §27100.
Id.
See NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 229-36.
Id.

160. Id.
161.

See DT-rT sons, supra note 6, at IV-41. According to the report, the public also favors

the protection of timberlands from the pressures of urbanization. Id.
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apparent public consensus has not been reflected by the actions of
the state legislature.' 62 Members of the California Legislature have
consistently rejected greater state involvement in this area and have
even lessened that involvement. 6' 3 For example, the CLCA originally
required that contract cancellations receive state approval. The
legislature removed this provision in 1969,164 possibly evidencing a
conviction that the preservation of farmland is a local matter. The
current Governor of California, George Deukmejian, has stated
expressly that preservation decisions should be made exclusively at
65
the local level.1
The hesitancy of the legislature to enact comprehensive planning
in California is probably attributable to two main factors. First,
California is a large state with great diversity. The tradition in the
state is that decisions affecting localities are best left to local
government.' 66 Secondly, certain interest groups have a stake in maintaining a relatively weak system of land use control.' 67 When fewer
restrictions are placed on the use of land, landowners and developers
have a greater variefy of choices regarding land sale and
development.' 68 The construction industry is supportive of this freedom
of choice because more potential job opportunities are created for
the industry. The environmental restrictions inherent in statewide planning schemes adversely affect options that are viewed as the tradi69
tional "rights" of the property owner.
Programs like the Land Use Act in Hawaii and the OLUA in Oregon
would be difficult to enact in California. Hawaii, unlike California,
has no tradition of local control of land use decision-making. The
Hawaiian system has been centralized since before Hawaii became
a state. In California, local control is the rule, and this control is
even guaranteed to an extent in the state constitution. 7 0 While the
Oregonian centralized planning system retains much in the way of
local control, a recent history of strong environmentalism 17 ' has en162.

See Dresslar, supra note 19, at 316-19.

163.

See FELL=MTH, supra note 3, at 39. In 1969 the CLCA was amended to allow for

the use-value assessment of open-space lands that were nonagricultural. The amendments also
removed a provision requiring approval of contract cancellations by the state. Id.
164. Id.
165. See CALiorRNiA SENATE CoaMItEE ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, LocAL EFFORTS TO CONSERVE AGRICuLTuRAL LAND 3 (Oct. 20, 1983).
166. See Dresslar, supra note 19, at 305.
167. See Godwin & Shepard, State Land Use Policies: Winners and Losers, 5 ENvTL. L.
703,713 (1975).
168. See CLAWSON, supra note 117, at 102-104.
169.

See NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 247.

170. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
171. An example of Oregonian environmentalism is a statute requiring deposits on all beverage
containers. See OR. Rnv. STAT. §§459.810-459.890.
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sured that local decision-making is made with great deference to the
interests of the state as a whole. While the OLUA has been attacked
in two referenda, advocates of the OLUA have prevailed at the polls,
indicating that environmentalism is strong enough in Oregon to control parochial interests. In California, however, local interests and
special interest groups are strong enough to prevent enactment of centralized planning by the state legislature.
The foregoing analysis has indicated that centralized planning can
be an effective tool for the preservation of prime agricultural lands.
While California has demonstrated some success with the preservation of farmlands on the coast through regional planning, the enactment of a comprehensive statewide land conservation system is unlikely.
Statewide planning is more restrictive than voluntary programs like
the CLCA and, therefore, is likely to encounter substantial political
resistance. A consensus of opinion strong enough to overcome the
opposition of special interest groups is necessary for the enactment
of centralized planning. This consensus has not been reached in California. Other alternatives to the CLCA, however, may not encounter
the same degree of resistance that has been encountered by centralized
planning. These alternatives include transfer of development rights
and land trusts.
D.

Land Trusts and Conservancies

One alternative to the CLCA that could provide for long-term preservation of prime croplands, but may not encounter the same political
resistance as statewide planning, is the land "trust" or conservancy
system.' 72 By this method, private, charitable organizations, or governmental entities, take effective control over the development of
farmlands by purchasing them. These lands then may be leased back
to farmers. Alternatively, the lands may be resold, but only after being
burdened with a restrictive "easement" that forecloses the right to
develop. '"1

172.

See generally Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method of PreservingOpen Space,

33 VmarD. L. REv. 1039, 1039-43 (1980) (an in-depth exploration of the land trust option);
speech by Donald Hagman, Public Acquisition and Disposal of Land as a Means of Development Control: Policies for the 70s, UCLA Institute of Government and Public Affairs (1970)

(provides a general exposition of the option of government-operated land trusts); Newton &
Boast, Preservationby Contract,PublicPurchase of Development Rights in Farmland, 4 CoLUM.
J. ENviRoNoENTAL L. 189, 189-93 (shows that the goals of land trusts can also be met by
direct governmental purchase of development rights).

173.

See Fenner, supra note 172, at 1064-69.
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The land trust arrangement has significant advantages over the
CLCA. First, the purchasing organization can select the lands that
are to be preserved. That decision is left to landowners by the CLCA,
and landowners may not make the most objective decision possible.
Secondly, the land may be preserved for as long as the purchasing
organization wishes. Protection can be of longer duration than under
a CLCA contract. Thirdly, land trust arrangements should be politically
acceptable because landowners are compensated for any loss of
development rights.' 7 4 In addition, the arrangements can provide tax
benefits.' 75 Since the fair market value of the land without the right
to develop is less than the value of land with development rights,
property tax assessments may be less for landowners who repurchase
the land from the trust organization or who agree to pay the property taxes as part of a leasing arrangement.' 76 Major short-term income tax savings may accrue to landowners who either donate land
to the trust or who sell land to the trust at a price below market
value. 177

Land trust arrangements already are available in California. Local
governments are specifically authorized to acquire real property,
easements, or other less than fee interests in land. 17 Also, private
land trusts exist in various areas of the state. 179 In the context of
coastal lands, a state funded land trust, the California Coastal
Conservancy,' 0 is authorized to purchase agricultural and other sensitive lands within the jurisdiction of the Coastal Commission.
Although land trusts have been established in California, and although
the state has the tools to expand this method of land preservation,
the cost of the technique has limited the usefulness of land trusts.
The experience of the Coastal Conservancy illustrates how high costs
hamper land trusts. The problem is that the relatively high value of
agricultural lands, like those in the coastal zone or on the urban fringe,
is a result of the development potential of these lands.' 1 If a landowner is not willing to donate the land to the trust or to sell the

174.
175.
176.

See NALS REPORT, supra note 32, at 168.
See Fenner, supra note 172, at 1064-69.
See id. at 1065-66.

177.

See id. at 1069-72. Landowners can take advantage of charitable deductions found

in the Internal Revenue Code. Id.

178. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§6950-6954 (purchase of fee interests in real property); CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§51050-51097 (purchase of easements or other less than fee interests).
179.

See Fenner, supra note 172, at 1045 (regarding the Napa County Land Trust); see

also FLETcER & LrrrE, supra note 19, at 144, regarding the Humboldt North Coast Land Trust.
180. See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §31156.
181.
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land at a bargain price, the trust may have to pay fair market value
for the land it wishes to acquire. When a trust resells land absent
the right to develop, the trust is selling land that is much less valuable
than the land the trust purchased. Consequently, the Coastal Conservancy has only been able to recoup about half of every dollar spent
on acquisition of environmentally sensitive lands. 8 2 For example, a
parcel of land might cost the Conservancy $500,000 to purchase, but
could be sold absent the right to develop for only about $250,000.
Moreover, budgetconstraints have prevented the Conservancy from
buying tracts of prime agricultural land.' 83 Desired tracts would have
cost the Conservancy about $1.5 million each, a price that is beyond
the budget of the Conservancy. 8"' Land trusts also have other
weaknesses.
.One weakness is that leaseback arrangements may be too inflexible
to be attractive to realistic farmers."'S Another is that private land
trusts lack the power of eminent domain. Purchase programs lacking
the power of eminent domain are subject to a landowner's willingness
to sell. Without the power of eminent domain, a land trust cannot
guarantee participation in a preservation program, or guarantee that
preservation will be accomplished on anything but a piecemeal basis.
The leaseback and eminent domain weaknesses are relatively minor
and probably can be solved. The high cost of land trusts, however,
cannot be avoided. In the absence of a large outlay of money by
the state, land trusts are probably not going to be a very useful tool
for a comprehensive farmland preservation program in California.
What the state needs is a politically acceptable method, one that compensates landowners for the loss of development rights, and which
will not require large outlays of state or local funds. One method
might be a transferable development rights program.
E.

Transferable Development Rights

A third possible alternative to the CLCA for the preservation of
California farmlands is the adoption of a system of transferable
development rights' 86 (hereinafter TDR). TDR, like land trusts, in182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.

185.

See Newton & Boast, supra note 172, at 202. "Relegated to the status of a county

tenant, a farmer would have been subjected to the uncertainties of the lease: the lease might
have been too short for sound crop planning and management, and too long to permit the

farmer to withdraw from farming for other reasons." Id.
& R. WRIGHT, CASES
186. See generally J. BEusCHER, M. GrrELmN

AND MATERIALS ON
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corporates the modem view that development rights are severable from
the physical location of the land.' 87 TDR is an extension of "cluster
zoning" and "planned unit development" concepts' that provide for
the relatively dense development of one portion of a parcel of land,
while leaving the remaining portion as open space. TDR has been
proposed as a method of preserving open space and historic sites, 8 9
and even as a substitute for traditional zoning. 90 In the context of
the preservation of agricultural lands, unfortunately, the method has
not met with much success. Only a few jurisdictions have experimented
with a TDR program to prevent the development of farmlands, and
the response has been less than overwhelming. Nevertheless, TDR is
a potentially effective method of development control, and more experimentation is needed before a determination can be made about
whether the concept should be discarded. Since farmland is extremely
important to California, and since the CLCA is ineffective, as
previously discussed, this state should try all feasible alternatives to
preserve prime croplands. TDR is one alternative that should be studied
and perhaps adopted in California.
The concept of TDR is relatively simple, although in practice a
TDR program might be quite complex. As a method of preserving
prime agricultural lands, a TDR program could resemble the following. First, a local government designates a "planning district" comprised of an area of undeveloped land that is subject to development
pressure.' 91 Within the planning district are two other designated areas,
a "conservation" zone and a "transfer" zone. 92 The conservation
zone consists of prime farmland that is appropriate for preservation.
As part of the TDR program, land within the conservation zone is
restricted to agricultural uses. The transfer zone consists of land that
is either not prime or is in some way more appropriate for
development.

USE 966, 966-73 (2d. Ed. 1976) (giving an overview of the concept of TDR); Hansen
& Schwartz, Two Methods for Preserving AgriculturalLand at the Urban Fringe: Use-Value
Assessment and Transferable Development Rights, 2 AORIUcrLTRE AND ENVmONMENT 165,
172-180 (1975); Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. Rv. 76, 81-84 (1978). Schnidman,
Transferable Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER
LAND

L. REv. 339, 339-41 (1976).
187.

The right is treated as one of the "bundle" of rights incident to land ownership, and

in the TDR concept is treated as a marketable item. See Beuscher, Gitelman & Wright, supra
note 186, at 966.
188. See Schnidman, supra note 186, at 342; Merriam, supra note 186, at 86-87.
189. See Schnidman, supra note 186, at 348-51.
190. Id.

191.
192.
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As compensation for bearing the burdens of preservation, landowners
in the conservation zone are issued a number of "development rights."
These rights may then be sold to a government operated development rights "bank," or directly to developers or other landowners
in the transfer zone.' 93 Although transfer zone lands are designated
for development, these lands are restricted so that only a minimal
level of density can be achieved without the purchase of development
rights from the conservation zone.' 9 4 To develop transfer zone lands
beyond the "base level" of density, developers are compelled to purchase development rights.' 9 5 This provision ensures that conservation
landowners will be compensated for the loss of their rights. For
example, a person desiring to develop transfer zone lands might be
limited to building two single family homes per acre, unless that person buys extra development rights from conservation zone landowners.
To achieve increasing levels of density, more development rights will
be required.
The strengths of a TDR program are threefold. First, lands in the
conservation zone can be restricted to provide enduring preservation.
Second, landowners receive compensation in the form of development
rights which, theoretically, can be exchanged for money between landowners and developers. Third, money paid to conservation landowners
comes from the other landowners or developers, not from public funds.
The public receives the benefits of agricultural preservation without
having to pay large sums of money for the privilege.
In practice, a TDR program would be more complex than the above
scenario might suggest. To begin with, a planning district must be
established and decisions made as to the number of development rights
to be issued. 96 Also, a determination of how development rights will
be allocated and who will receive them must be made.' 97 Finally, a
process must be created by which development rights may be bought
and sold.'9 8
Creation of the planning district cannot take place in a vacuum.

193. See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 186, at 175. Ideally, a development rights bank
would have the power of eminent domain in order to purchase development rights from reluc-

tant owners. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. "For example, a district may require no development rights for two units per acre
of residential housing, but have a density bonus that permits construction of up to eight units

per acre if landowners (purchase) the TDRs (development rights) needed for the additional
units." Id.
196. Id. at 174.
197. Id. at 174-75.
198. Id. at 175.
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Aside from determining which lands should be developed and which
should be preserved, the development market must be analyzed carefully to ensure that a demand for development exists in the area,
and that the demand for development is sufficient to obtain the desired
density in the transfer district. These market considerations are vital
to the success of a TDR program.' 99 Without an adequate demand
for development, comprehensive plans regarding the transfer district
cannot be fulfilled. In addition, development demand must be sufficient to ensure that conservation zone landowners will be able to sell
their development rights and be compensated for the restrictions imposed on their lands.
The next step in implementing a TDR program is the allocation
of development rights to landowners in the conservation zone. 20 The
market value of these lands undoubtedly will vary according to their
development potential. 20 ' The number of rights issued to a given landowner, then, probably should depend on the size and development
potential of the landowner's parcel. A more simple method might
be to issue development rights according to acreage owned. For
example, a landowner with 100 acres of prime land would be issued
100 development rights. Either method, of course, could elicit political
opposition from landowners who feel they are being treated unfairly
compared with their neighbors. The choice, therefore, might be a difficult one to make.
The final component in the adoption of a TDR planning system
is the creation of a process by which development rights are bought
and sold. Rights might be transferred on the open market, or through
a government operated development rights "bank" that would buy
and sell the rights as a middleman.20 2 The open market option would
require no outlay of government funds, but would be more difficult
to regulate. The bank option would require the government initially
to pay conservation zone landowners for their development rights,
but would allow developers easy access to those rights without having
to negotiate sales with individual conservation zone landowners. In
either case, a working market must be ensured, otherwise the entire
scheme may collapse.

199.
200.

See Merriam, supra note 186, at 131.
See Hansen & Schwartz, supra note 186, at 174-75.

201. Id. Land closer to services and major roads, for example, would be more valuable
for development than more isolated lands that would require substantial initial investments
to prepare for development. Id.
202.
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F.

Experience With TDR

TDR programs are attractive because in theory they can provide
long-term preservation of agricultural lands, compensate landowners
for a loss of rights without a huge outlay of government funds and
provide a new tool for sound land use planning at the local level.2" 3
The implementation of a TDR proposal similar to the one outlined
above, however, could prove quite complex. One great difficulty in
establishing a TDR system is predicting the future. The system is based
on a gamble that the interest in developing the transfer district will
be sufficient to induce the purchase of development rights to the extent
that landowners will be compensated and the desired density for the
transfer zone will be reached.
The difficulty in predicting the future may be an important factor
underlying the limited experimentation with TDR. The concept of
transferable development rights has existed for more than two decades;
yet, only about a dozen jurisdictions have enacted TDR ordinances
aimed at preserving agricultural or other open-space lands.10 In addition, none of those proposals effectively forecloses the possibility
of development in the conservation zone.2"' Perhaps because of political
considerations, landowners instead are given the option of developing at a low density or selling some of their development rights.2"6
After forty-seven years of collective experience with TDR by these
jurisdictions, only 107 development rights had been transferred and
184 acres preserved by 1981.207
The scope and ambition of TDR ordinances have been limited,
however, and a possibility remains that TDR yet could prove to be
an effective method of preserving agricultural lands. TDR is too attractive to be eliminated as an alternative to the CLCA, but more
experience with the method is needed before the true potential can
be assessed. Although uncertain, TDR should be considered seriously
in light of the long-term consequences of the loss of prime farmlands,
and must be weighed against the options discussed here and against
other proposals that have been made.
G. Assessing the Alternatives
The proposals discussed to this point all have the potential of being
203. Id. at 179.
204. See NALS
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.

REPORT,

supra note 32, at 177.
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more effective than the CLCA for the conservation of prime
agricultural lands in California. Each proposal, however, has
drawbacks. Statewide, centralized planning apparently lacks sufficient
support to be enacted in California. Land trust programs suffer from
an unavailability of funds. Transferable development rights proposals
suffer from complexity and economic uncertainty.
This author proposes that, while a strong statewide planning program may not be adopted in California, the state can do more to
encourage comprehensive and effective planning for the preservation
of farmland. An example is provided by the state of Wisconsin.
Wisconsin has provided not only tax benefits to farmers, but also
has been successful in helping to create a consensus of opinion by
which better planning is possible.
INCENTIVES TowARD BETTER PLANNING:

Tim FARmLAND PRESERVATION ACT
The Farmland Preservation Act 20 8 (hereinafter the FPA), enacted
by Wisconsin in 1977, may provide an example for effective and
politically acceptable agricultural land preservation in California. The

FPA, like the CLCA, is an enabling act that allows counties to offer
owners of prime agricultural lands 209 a tax advantage in return for
a restrictive use agreement. FPA contracts last five years, 210 and, unlike
the CLCA, do not contain automatic renewal or cancellation provisions. The FPA is similar in some respects to the CLCA, and a program like the FPA may be adoptable in California without undue
upheaval. The two programs, however, contain significant differences.
One important difference between the FPA and the CLCA is in
the form of tax advantage. Instead of reducing property tax
assessments, the FPA offers farmers state income tax credits or
rebates. 21' The size of the credit or rebate varies according to how
212
burdensome a farmer's property taxes are in relation to farm income.
Those farmers having the lowest income and the highest property taxes
receive the greatest benefits. In other words, farmers with relatively
208. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§91.01-.79.
209. The FPA does not define prime agricultural lands per se. Lands eligible for enrollment
must be in parcels of 35 acres or more, and must produce average annual gross profits of

at least $6,000 from their agricultural use, which can include such things as beekeeping, fish
or fur farming, floriculture, and sod fanning, as well as growing table crops and raising livestock.
Id. §91.01.
210. Id. §91.13.
211. Id. §71.09(11). This statute contains the tax provisions of the FPA. Id.
212. Id. §71.09(11)(a)7(am).
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small-scale operations on the urban fringe generally will have the
highest property taxes compared to income. These farmers will receive
larger rebates or credits than farmers with large-scale operations outside the urban fringe, where property taxes should be lower. Unlike
the CLCA, this arrangement not only focuses incentives toward those
farmers who are most susceptible to development pressure, but also
avoids a direct loss of income by local governments. Local governments do not lose revenue because property taxes are not reduced.
This result could increase the chances for local government support.
The most important aspect of the FPA is not the form of the tax
advantage, however. The important component is the FPA requirement that participating counties enact either (1) agricultural preservation plans,2" 3 if the county is primarily rural, or (2) exclusive
agricultural zoning,2" 4 if the county is primarily urban. During the
initial five years after the enactment of the FPA, contracts were
temporary.215 If the participating counties did not enact zoning or
preservation plans by five years after enactment of the statute, the
contracts would automatically terminate, and all credits or rebates
received by farmers would have to be repaid. 21 6 This provided an incentive for enrolled farmers to support vigorously the adoption of preservation plans or zoning. 217 As an additional incentive, credits and rebates
doubled upon adoption of preservation plans and zoning. 2'1 In addition to incentives for the farmers, the FPA provides incentives for
effective local governmental participation.
The FPA mandated that plans and zoning conform with state
guidelines for structure and administration." 9 Careful studies were
220
required to determine which agricultural lands should be preserved.
The FPA provided for state funding of the study process,2 21 so that
the expense would not deter counties from participating, and so that
counties might be able to employ outside help to compensate for any
lack of expertise or manpower on the county planning staffs.
From all indications, the Wisconsin program has effectively enrolled
213. Id. §§91.51-.56.
214. Id. §§91.71-.79.
215. Id. §§91.35-.41. In the language of the statute, these are "initial agreements" that
last until preservation plans or zoning are adopted or until the deadline is past. Initial agreements
can be entered into at any time during the first five years the FPA is in effect, and might
or might not last five years. Id.
216. Id.
217. See FLETCHER & LrTTL, supra note 19, at 17-20.
218. Wis. STAT. ANN. §71.09(11)(a)7(cm)f.
219. Id. §§91.51-.79.
220. Id. §§91.05, 91.53, 91.73.
221. Id.
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farmers and provided the opportunity for effective planning. 22 The
genius in the FPA is in the use of tax advantages not only to obtain
restrictive use agreements, but to create support for stricter and more
comprehensive planning for the preservation of farmlands than that
which existed previously. The FPA also avoids providing an incentive to local governments to refrain from using the act. A local government will have fewer worries about tax losses, and may be more inclined to administer the preservation measure effectively. The avoidance
of a financial disincentive to local governments and the use of tax
incentives to create a consensus for effective planning give the FPA
an advantage over the CLCA. California should adopt a similar
measure.
Follow the Example of Wisconsin
Any attempt to replace the CLCA with a farmland conservation
measure similar to the FPA undoubtedly would face opposition. The
owners of large landholdings removed from the urban fringe have
vested interests in the CLCA and tax benefits provided by the Act.
The beneficiaries of the CLCA have the resources to mount substantial political opposition to proposals that may affect their interests
adversely.223 In addition, developers and construction industry groups
have a stake in the current, relatively weak system of land use plaifning and decision-making, and certainly would oppose a measure that
might make the system more strict. 224
A program modeled after the FPA might also be opposed as being
too costly. The state of Wisconsin annually pays an estimated seven
to ten dollars in tax credits for each acre of land protected by the
FPA. 225 At first glance, this looks like a substantial drain on the state
budget. The CLCA, however, may cost participating local governments more than $30 million in lost tax revenues each year.226 Of
this total, the state annually reimburses local governments about $13.5
million. 27 Fewer than one million acres of urban prime lands are
enrolled in the CLCA.228 The state, therefore, is paying substantially
more than $7 to $10 per acre for a dubious degree of protection for
the lands most in danger of being developed. The FPA, which focuses
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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FLETCHER & LiTTLE, supra note 19, at 17-21.
FELLMETH, supra note 3, at 41 (listing top ten beneficiaries of the CLCA).
supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
FLETCHER & L=rma, supra note 19, at 19.
id. at 20; NALS RE1o'RT, supra note 32, at 210.
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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on urban fringe lands and contains planning provisions lacking in
the CLCA, is a bargain by comparison.
Effective administration of a program like the FPA also could be
a problem. The FPA relies on local planning and zoning to achieve
its purposes, and the act works no profound changes in the structure
or enforcement of planning and zoning. In the past, many local governments have not used zoning and planning to the advantage of farmland
preservation. Indications are present, however, that local governments
are becoming more responsive to the idea that the best agricultural
lands should be conserved. About half the counties in California have
adopted urban "limit" zones that of themselves cannot halt urban
229
sprawl, but which at least evidence a policy of containing sprawl.
Some counties, without state compulsion, have used all available means
to keep development out of agricultural areas.23 Other counties and
cities, through local government action or voter initiative, have shown
a willingness to try innovative methods of limiting growth or channeling
that growth to nonagricultural areas.21
A program similar to the FPA could encourage and accelerate what
might be an emerging consensus in favor of preserving prime farmlands
and provide a focus for efforts now being made by California localities.
Despite inevitable political opposition and concerns about cost, the
California Legislature should show some fortitude and replace the
CLCA with a program that follows the essential provisions of the
FPA. A preservation program like the FPA could enlist as allies both
urban fringe farmers, who would have a stake in the adoption of
preservation plans and exclusive agricultural zoning, and local governments, that are losing property tax revenues because of the CLCA.
If the legislature can communicate the importance of preserving
agricultural land to the voters and convince them to favor farmland
preservation measures, the state could have a coalition strong enough
to overcome the short-sighted provincialism and special interest influence that dominates current land use policy making.
CONCLUSION

The CLCA has proved ineffective in preserving prime agricultural
lands in California. The state legislature should replace the CLCA
with a measure similar to the FPA enacted by Wisconsin in 1977.

229.
230.
231.

See LocAL EFFORTS, supra note 165, at 3.
Id.
Id.
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This comment has explored four alternatives, any one of which could,
if used to full potential, be more effective than the CLCA. Probably
the strongest method of farmland preservation would be statewide,
centralized land use planning. This alternative, however, is not likely
to be adopted in California because of political opposition. Another
option is the extensive use of land trusts. Land trusts are politically
acceptable, but would require a large outlay of funds, and these funds
are probably not going to be forthcoming. A third alternative is the
widespread use of transferable development rights programs. Although
TDR programs have the potential of being effective methods of preserving farmlands, they require a prediction of future local development markets, and considerably more experimentation may be needed
before TDR can be utilized effectively.
The final alternative is the one chosen by Wisconsin. The Farmland
Preservation Act gives enough deference to local decision-makers to
be politically acceptable; yet, the Act contains guidelines for effective
farmland preservation. The strength of the FPA lies in the potential
of the Act to build a consensus for the preservation of important
farmlands. The benefits of the Act are focused on urban fringe
croplands and are tied to comprehensive preservation planning at the
local level. California should follow the lead of Wisconsin and adopt
a program substantially similar to the FPA. This state cannot afford
to let an unfettered land market control the future of California
agricultural lands. Prompt and effective action is required to ensure
that the bountiful diversity of agriculture in California will not be
someday only an irretrievable memory.
Bruce Buck

1180

